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JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
SERIOUSLY OUTSIDE THE COURTS
James E. Fleming*
INTRODUCTION
Larry Sager and Larry Kramer have written important books that,
in quite different ways, call for taking the Constitution seriously
outside the courts. Sager's Justice in Plainclothes' and Kramer's The
People Themselves2 nonetheless join issue in significant ways, and
therefore it is illuminating to analyze them as a pair.
To get a handle on the differences between the two Larrys' books, I
have concocted the following fanciful hypothetical. Imagine a law
school with a faculty that includes Ronald Dworkin: court-centered
constitutional theorist extraordinaire and proponent of a liberal moral
reading of the American Constitution.3 Further imagine that the
faculty includes two Larrys, each of whom is quite brilliant. And
imagine that this law school has an omnipotent dean who can dictate
to faculty members what scholarly projects they shall undertake.
Let us posit that this dean gives each Larry an assignment. She
charges one Larry with developing a broadly speaking Dworkinian
constitutional theory, but one that is better grounded in our actual
constitutional practice and scheme of institutions than is Dworkin's
moral reading of the Constitution. She says Ronnie has given us
justice tailored on "Savile Row," not ready-made on "Seventh
Avenue."4 But, she continues, we need "justice in plainclothes."
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I prepared this Essay for the
Symposium on Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts,
Fordham University School of Law, November 19, 2004. Thanks to Sot Barber,
Abner Greene, Linda McClain, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments concerning a
draft, and to John Ferejohn, Willy Forbath, Larry Kramer, and Larry Sager for
incisive remarks at the symposium.
1. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American
Constitutional Practice (2004).
2. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (2004).
3. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom's Law].
4. See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion,
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 29 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life's
Dominion].
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She assigns the other Larry the project of formulating the antithesis
of a Dworkinian constitutional theory, one that rejects Dworkin's
''curious notion of the judiciary as a 'forum of principle'' along with
its implication that courts should protect the Constitution and the
people from the people themselves.' Our esteemed dean observes
that some have proposed that we take the Constitution away from
courts altogether.6 Instead, she states, we need a theory of "judicial
review without judicial supremacy."
In carrying out these assignments, what might our two hypothetical
Larrys come up with? The first might write a book like our real Larry
Sager's Justice in Plainclothes. And the second might write a book
like our real Larry Kramer's The People Themselves. I should make
clear that I have not gone through this hypothetical because I think it
describes the actual practice of any dean at any law school or the
actual motivations of either Larry. Rather, I have done so to craft a
lens through which to view these two remarkably fine books.
I. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PAIRING THE TWO BOOKS
What are the justifications for pairing these two evidently quite
different books-in particular, in a program entitled "Theories of
Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts"? We might
offer three basic reasons. First, one might pair them precisely because
they are diametrically opposed theories: Sager as court-loving justice-
seeker versus Kramer as court-bashing populist who rejects court-
loving justice-seeking as elitist and aristocratic. I have encapsulated
this opposition with my hypothetical involving the omnipotent dean.
Second, one might pair these two theories because they
complement one another and provide the ingredients necessary for an
adequate theory of taking the Constitution seriously outside the
courts. I shall take this tack in this Essay, pursuing reconciliation
between these two evidently opposing theories.
The third reason for pairing them is that they illustrate different
versions of popular constitutionalism. I shall distinguish five versions
of popular constitutionalism, ranging from conceptions that reject
judicial review altogether through conceptions that are compatible
with judicial supremacy. Doing so will sharpen our understanding of
Larry Kramer's project and enable us to get a handle on its
differences from, as well as its similarities to, Larry Sager's project. I
do this also because I fear that there is a lot of loose and unrigorous
talk about what it is we are talking about when we speak of popular
constitutionalism. The five versions are:
1. Populist anti-constitutionalism that at bottom opposes
constitutional limits on popular self-government, not to mention
5. Kramer, supra note 2, at 222.
6. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
[Vol. 731378
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rejects judicial review enforcing such limits. Perhaps no one actually
espouses this view, but Richard D. Parker at least comes close to
doing so.
7
2. Popular constitutionalism that accepts constitutional limits on
self-government, but rejects judicial review to enforce those limits.
This view is illustrated by Jeremy Waldron, for example, in Law and
Disagreement' and by Mark Tushnet in Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts.9
3. Popular constitutionalism that accepts constitutional limits on
self-government and accepts judicial review, but rejects judicial
supremacy. This view is represented by Larry Kramer. He rejects
judicial supremacy in favor of both departmentalism and populism.
By departmentalism, I mean the idea that legislatures and executives
share with courts authority to interpret the Constitution and indeed
are the ultimate interpreters on certain questions. By populism, I
mean the idea that the people themselves are the ultimate
interpreters over and against the departments. Note that Kramer,
unlike Waldron and Tushnet, does not propose "taking the
Constitution away from the courts" altogether. Instead, Kramer
proposes "judicial review without judicial supremacy."' 0
4. Departmentalists who are not populists. For example, Keith
Whittington embraces constitutional construction by legislatures and
executives alongside constitutional interpretation by courts.1' Less
obviously, Larry Sager comes within this category of popular
constitutionalism, because his underenforcement thesis commits him
to the idea that certain constitutional norms are judicially
underenforced; their fuller enforcement is left to legislatures and
executives, who share with courts the authority to interpret the
Constitution, i.e., in the Constitution outside the courts.12 We could
put Cass Sunstein (and certainly me) in this category, too. 3
5. Social movement popular constitutionalism that does not
challenge judicial supremacy at all, but focuses on how popular
social movements outside the courts transform the norms that
7. Richard D. Parker, "Here, the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist
Manifesto (1994). Here I should also mention the progressive anti-constitutionalism
of Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (2004).
8. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999).
9. Tushnet, supra note 6.
10. Kramer, supra note 2, at 249-53.
11. See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning (1999); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:
Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (1999).
12. Sager, supra note 1, at 84-128.
13. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993); James E. Fleming,
The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 215 (2000).
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ultimately are accepted by the courts. This view is illustrated by
Reva Siegel, Robert Post, and William Forbath. 14
And so, from the standpoint of my typology, we can see that the
two Larrys, despite their considerable differences, are just one step
away from each other. That, of course, may be a rather large step.
In reflecting upon the two books, I plan to take two comparative,
constructive tacks, the first comparing Sager and Dworkin, the second
Sager and Kramer. First, I shall show how Sager helps make a
Dworkinian moral reading of the Constitution the best it can be.
Critics of Dworkin's conception of the moral reading characteristically
charge that it is a theory of the perfect liberal Constitution, a theory
that (1) fails to fit our actual imperfect Constitution and doctrine, and
(2) is not adequately grounded in an account of our constitutional
practice and scheme of institutions. Sager's justice-seeking account of
our constitutional practice helps rebut such charges. Nonetheless,
Sager's account is too court-loving and too skeptical about
legislatures, executives, and the people themselves for its own good.
Second, I shall suggest that Kramer helps remedy certain
shortcomings of Sager's account in this respect. At the same time,
Sager helps fill in certain gaps in Kramer's development of popular
constitutionalism. Thus, I shall suggest that the two Larrys' theories
together-compounded in the right measure-provide the ingredients
for an adequate theory of taking the Constitution seriously outside the
courts. Let me preview three examples of such compounds. The first
concerns the domain of popular constitutionalism: Kramer calls for
revitalizing popular constitutionalism, yet he gives no account of the
domain of popular constitutionalism as distinguished from, on the one
hand, ordinary politics and, on the other, political justice. Sager
provides an insightful account of the domain of constitutional justice
as distinguished from ordinary politics and political justice.15 Kramer
should refine his account in light of Sager's.
The second involves the partnership model as a moderate
departmentalism: Sager proposes a model of legislatures and courts as
partners in seeking constitutional justice,16 yet he gives no account of
how legislatures will go about interpreting the Constitution. Worse
yet, his picture of legislatures leaves one to worry that they will not be
up to the challenge of giving full constitutional protection to judicially
14. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 Cal. L. Rev.
959, 975-85 (2004) (analyzing scholarship by Siegel, Post, and Forbath). There are
other versions of popular constitutionalism, such as Matthew Adler's group-relative
account of constitutional law, but they do not fit so tidily into my continuum. See
Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose
Practices Ground U.S. Law? (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
15. See Sager, supra note 1, at 129-60.
16. Id. at 70-83.
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underenforced constitutional norms.'7 Kramer defends a conception
of departmentalism within which we can readily comprehend
legislatures as partners with courts in interpreting the Constitution
and seeking constitutional justice.'" Sager would do well to refine his
model of partnership to embrace a moderate departmentalism within
which the coordinate branches of the national government share
authority to interpret the Constitution and are presumed to have the
capacity to do so.'9
The third, related point concerns constitutional interpretation
outside the courts, by legislatures, executives, and citizens generally.
Both Larrys need an account of such interpretation. Each calls for it,
though in different domains: Sager with judicially underenforced
norms that are to be more fully enforced by legislatures and
executives, 20 Kramer with departmentalism and populism in general
and with the structural Constitution in particular. 2' Neither gives an
adequate account of constitutional interpretation outside the courts.
To develop an adequate account, we need to combine Sager's judicial
underenforcement thesis (when it comes to liberty-bearing provisions)
with Kramer's arguments against aggressive judicial enforcement of
the structural Constitution (when it comes to federalism and
separation of powers). We need more beyond that, as we shall see.
II. MAKING THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION THE
BEST IT CAN BE
Sager provides a justice-seeking account of our constitutional
practice. We will take up its main features as we go along: (1) the
partnership model versus the agency model; (2) the underenforcement
thesis; (3) the account of the domain of constitutional justice; and (4)
the idea that the obduracy of Article V to constitutional amendment is
a virtue, not a vice.
Dworkin advances the "moral reading" of the American
Constitution: the Constitution embodies abstract moral principles
rather than laying down particular historical conceptions, and
interpreting and applying those principles require fresh judgments of
political theory about how they are best understood.22 Sager's justice-
17. Id. at 195-207.
18. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 106-11 (one way of conceiving Kramer's project is
that of revitalizing departmentalism over and against judicial supremacy).
19. I put state governments to one side, leaving it to Aaron Saiger to probe this
dimension of partnership in his account. See Aaron Saiger, Constitutional Partnership
and the States, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1439 (2005).
20. See Sager, supra note 1, at 84-128.
21. See generally Kramer, supra note 2; Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000) [hereinafter
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back].
22. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 3, at 1-38; Dworkin, Life's Dominion,
supra note 4, at 118-47.
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seeking account is unmistakably a moral reading. Here I want to
show how Sager helps make the moral reading of the Constitution the
best it can be.
Dworkin's development of the moral reading makes it sound (1)
more utopian and (2) more philosophical than it should. Therefore,
he triggers objections that he propounds (1) a theory of the "perfect
Constitution '23 and (2) a theory that entails that judges should be
philosophers.24 To be fair to Dworkin, he does not claim that the
moral reading is a moral realist reading: a reading that is prior to and
independent of our own political and constitutional order and
practice, and true to the moral order of the universe .2  Rather, he
contends that the moral reading is constrained by the requirements of
fit and integrity: thus, it is bound to account for the legal materials of
our existing constitutional order and practice.26  And so, even if
Dworkin's theory of constitutional interpretation aims to provide the
best interpretation of these legal materials-to make the Constitution
the best it can be-it is not unbounded.
Nonetheless, some critics charge that Dworkin's moral reading is
utopian in two senses. One, it is a moral reading for a perfect liberal
utopia: he would interpret the Constitution to protect every right and
produce every outcome that his liberal political philosophy would
entail. And two, it is literally a theory for no place: he would give the
same moral reading irrespective of the actual history and practice of
the constitutional scheme, for example, the same for Britain as for the
United States. I do not believe that such critics are right about
Dworkin's moral reading, but they certainly are persistent and
warrant a fuller response than simply directing them to read Dworkin
more carefully.
Dworkin himself, in Freedom's Law, when confronted with the
"perfect Constitution" challenge,27 basically pleaded: "I do not
believe our Constitution is perfect. For example, while I do believe
that justice requires welfare rights, I do not believe that our
Constitution protects such rights." He continued in essence: "Your
challenge applies to Frank Michelman - not me-because he-not I-
believes that our Constitution does protect welfare rights.' 28 Dworkin
23. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353
(1981).
24. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Should Constitutional Judges Be
Philosophers?, in Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin
(Scott Hershovitz ed., forthcoming 2005).
25. For such moral realist accounts, see, for example, Sotirios A. Barber, The
Constitution of Judicial Power (1993); and Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural
Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2087 (2001).
26. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 3, at 10-11; Ronald Dworkin, Law's
Empire (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's Empire].
27. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 3, at 36. In this paragraph I draw
upon James E. Fleming, Lawrence's Republic, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 563, 581 (2004).
28. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 3, at 36 (citing Frank I. Michelman,
1382 [Vol. 73
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might just as well have pointed his finger at Larry Sager in this
context. Beyond that, Dworkin is at pains to make clear, as noted
above, that the constraints of fit and integrity entail that our actual
Constitution is imperfect when measured against the standards of any
normative political philosophy or conception of justice.
My tack for responding to the perfect Constitution challenge to
Dworkin's moral reading is to show how Sager's justice-seeking
account helps meet the challenge, in particular, through its accounts of
the thinness of constitutional justice and more particularly of the
moral shortfall of judicially enforceable constitutional law. Sager
argues that certain constitutional principles required by justice are
judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may impose affirmative
obligations outside the courts on legislatures, executives, and citizens
generally to realize them more fully. 9 Sager's view is an important
component of a full moral reading or justice-seeking account of the
Constitution. For it helps make sense of the evident thinness or moral
shortfall of constitutional law. For example, instead of saying that the
Constitution does not secure welfare rights-the move that Dworkin
makes-Sager says that the Constitution does secure welfare rights,
but it leaves their enforcement in the first instance to legislatures and
executives.3" Once a scheme of welfare rights and benefits is in place,
courts have a secondary role in enforcing it equally and fairly.3'
Furthermore, if Dworkin's moral reading of the Constitution,
though it embodies abstract moral principles, does not incorporate all
the important principles of justice, we need an account of the
difference between the two. Because Dworkin does not offer such an
account, he may leave his readers wondering whether his theory
entails that the American Constitution is a perfect liberal
Constitution. To be sure, the constraints of fit and integrity entail a
gap between the Constitution and justice. But Dworkin says little
about any such gap, and what he does say implies that the gap may be
narrow. For example, he says that the Constitution is abstract, and
therefore it should come as no surprise that any right we can argue for
as a matter of political morality we can also argue for as a matter of
constitutional law.32 And where he does acknowledge a significant
gap between the Constitution and justice, for example, with welfare
rights, he does not provide a general account of why the Constitution
as he conceives it does not incorporate elements of justice like welfare
rights.
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 7 (1969)).
29. Sager, supra note 1, at 84-128.
30. See id. at 84-88.
31. See id. at 95-102.
32. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 3, at 73.
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Sager's account of the domain of constitutional justice helps in this
regard. He distinguishes (1) judicially enforceable constitutional law
from (2) constitutional justice, which he in turn distinguishes from (3)
political justice and (4) morality generally.33 Imagine a series of
progressively thicker concentric circles representing these four
domains. Dworkin's highly general formulation of the "moral
reading" may seem to blur the distinction between constitutional law
and constitutional justice, as well as that between constitutional justice
and political justice, and indeed that between constitutional law, on
the one hand, and political justice and morality generally, on the
other. Sager's justice-seeking account underscores just how thin a
moral reading of the Constitution has to be-as compared to our
thicker conceptions of political justice and morality-in order to be
credible as an account of our constitutional practice.
Sager's frequent co-author Christopher Eisgruber, in an essay
entitled Should Constitutional Judges Be Philosophers?, has argued
that Dworkin's theory of constitutional interpretation is "significantly
incomplete."34 I shall examine two gaps that Eisgruber identifies, and
that I believe Sager helps fill. First, according to Eisgruber, Dworkin
lacks a theory of our institutions: "Dworkin's presentation of his
theory relies too heavily upon claims about hermeneutics-claims
about the interpretation of language and law in general (as opposed to
claims about American constitutional procedures and institutions in
particular)."35 Second, Dworkin lacks a theory that would account for
our abstract Constitution's obduracy to constitutional amendment:
"Dworkin's arguments about moral principle and the Constitution
presuppose an unarticulated, controversial theory about the purpose
of written constitutions and super-majoritarian ... procedures" for
amending them.36 Eisgruber links these two gaps: "[W]e must know
what purposes are served by having an American-style constitution.
And to know that, we must have Dworkin's theory of constitutional
institutions, a theory he has not yet given us."37 The implication of
Eisgruber's critique, as he develops it, is that Dworkin's moral reading
needs to be supplemented by a theory like his own theory of
constitutional self-government.38 I shall mimic Eisgruber's approach
and contend that his critique shows that Dworkin's moral reading
needs to be supplemented by a theory like Sager's justice-seeking
account to fill these two gaps. Now let us turn to the two gaps.
33. Sager, supra note 1, at 129-60; see also Lawrence G. Sager, The Why of
Constitutional Essentials, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1421, 1423-29 (2004) (using concentric
circles to illustrate these four domains).
34. See Eisgruber, supra note 24, at 3.
35. Id. at 29.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 30.
38. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001).
1384 [Vol. 73
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In recent years, many constitutional theorists have railed against the
Constitution's, in particular Article V's, obduracy to amendment.
Dworkin for the most part has ignored this movement. Sager shows
how the Constitution's obduracy to amendment is a virtue, not a
vice.39 It is a virtue not only because it encourages and requires the
right kind of deliberation about constitutional change-it "causes
popular constitutional decision-makers to take account of their own
future interests and those of their children and their children's
children"°-but also because it encourages and fosters wide-bodied
interpretation of the highly abstract Constitution we have
(interpretation of the sort that Dworkin argues for and that the moral
reading entails).41 It fosters the partnership model, as contrasted with
the misguided agency (or instruction-taking or originalist) model.
Relatedly, Sager's book helps answer the charge that Dworkin
would have constitutional judges be philosophers. Sager provides an
account of a justice-seeking practice in which judges, instead of being
moral philosophers, are pragmatic, forward-looking partners with
founders/amenders and contemporary legislatures in pursuing
constitutional justice. The partnership is both vertical-with
founders/amenders-in seeking justice over time, and horizontal-
especially with Congress-in giving fuller protection to judicially
underenforced constitutional norms at any given time.
One aspect of the horizontal partnership - Sager's
underenforcement thesis-may entail a conception of legislative
responsibility congenial to the conception that Dworkin's early work
promised but never fully provided. I refer to the "doctrine of political
responsibility" that Dworkin argued (in "Hard Cases") is incumbent
on legislatures as well as courts.4 2  The doctrine of political
responsibility implies that legislatures have an obligation to engage in
coherent, responsible legislating with integrity (not precisely as
coherent, responsible, and constrained as judging with integrity, but
legislating with integrity nonetheless). And in Law's Empire, he
speaks of integrity in legislation as well as integrity in adjudication.43
It is an underappreciated aspect of Dworkin's theory that it contains
the seeds of a conception of legislating with integrity that Dworkin
himself never has fully delivered. Many critics and sympathizers alike
just lump Dworkin in with court-lovers and legislature-disparagers.
Obviously, his (overdrawn) distinction between courts as "the forum
of principle" and legislatures as the "battleground of power politics""
39. Sager, supra note 1, at 8, 179, 214-19.
40. Id. at 217.
41. Id. at 218; see also James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American
People, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513, 1533-34 (1998).
42. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 87 (1977).
43. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 26, at 167, 176-84, 217-28.
44. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 69-71 (1985) [hereinafter
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle].
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encourages this view. But in his early work Dworkin expects more
from legislatures than do most court-lovers and legislature-
disparagers.
Jeremy Waldron opens The Dignity of Legislation by suggesting
that he aspires to do for legislation what Dworkin "purports to [have
done] for adjudicative reasoning."45 I interpret Waldron to mean that
he aims to develop a conception of legislating with integrity, if not
integrity in legislation.46 Admittedly, Dworkin himself has not done
this. Nor for that matter has Waldron fully accomplished it. Nor has
Sager, but his work, intentionally or not, carries us along in that
direction. I view his idea of judicial underenforcement, coupled with
his notion that legislatures have the obligation to enforce
constitutional norms and seek constitutional justice, as furthering
Dworkin's unfinished business regarding legislating with responsibility
and integrity. For one thing, Sager views legislatures as constrained
by the Constitution outside the courts, not just as legislating in
constitutionally gratuitous ways. For another, Sager views legislatures
as partners with courts in pragmatically pursuing constitutional justice.
Sager's distinction between the partnership model and the agency
model helps free us from the grips of what I have called "the
originalist premise": "the assumption that originalism, rightly
conceived is the best, or indeed the only, conception of fidelity in
constitutional interpretation."47  Indeed, his distinction suggests a
sense in which Dworkin's moral reading ironically seems too much
like an abstract originalism: too much like an instruction-taking
account (understanding the instructions to be abstract moral
principles). Dworkin, always a master rhetorician, tries to turn the
tables on the originalists, arguing that commitment to fidelity in
constitutional interpretation entails that we embrace the moral
reading and that the narrow originalists are the real "revisionists."4
Because of this move, Dworkin can come across like an abstract
originalist. Indeed, interpretations of Dworkin as an abstract
originalist have prompted the question, "Are We All Originalists
Now?"4 9 No one would characterize Sager as an abstract originalist,
although he does ask, rhetorically, "Are we all justice seekers?" and,
"Are we all agency theorists?" (i.e., originalists of one stripe or
45. See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation 1 (1999).
46. See Jeremy Waldron, Legislating with Integrity, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 373
(2003) (distinguishing between legislating with integrity and integrity in legislation).
47. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1335, 1344 (1997) (emphasis added).
48. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 3, at 74-76; Dworkin, Life's Dominion,
supra note 4, at 125-29.
49. See James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, Alpheus T.
Mason Lecture in Constitutional Law and Political Thought (Sept. 19, 2002), available
at http://web.princeton.edu/sites/madison/events/archives/FlemingTalk.pdf.
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another)." Sager answers both of these questions with an emphatic
"No!," just as I have answered the question, "Are We All Originalists
Now?," with a pointed "I Hope Not!"5
Furthermore, Sager develops a conception of constitutional justice
that has advantages over Dworin's conception, both in structure and
content. First, Sager interprets Dworkin's account as
"democratarian," with a structure that is parallel to that of John Hart
Ely's process-perfecting theory in Democracy and Distrust:52 it justifies
judicial review to reinforce the preconditions for democracy. On
democratarian views, the domain of constitutional justice is justice-
seeking in a limited sense: we should interpret the Constitution to
seek justice to the extent of perfecting the preconditions for
democracy. 3 Dworkin, as I have argued elsewhere, has taken a page
out of Ely's book, framing all of our basic liberties as preconditions
for democ.racy, or packing all of the requirements of constitutional
justice into preconditions for democracy.54 But it is strained to present
all of our basic liberties, both substantive and procedural, as
preconditions for democracy. The structure of Sager's justice-seeking
account, like that of my own Constitution-perfecting theory 5 does
not require such recasting of substantive liberties into a democratarian
mold. Instead, Sager offers a justice-seeking view in which the
preconditions for democracy are part but not the whole of
constitutional justice.
Second, the substance of Sager's justice-seeking account of the
domain of constitutional justice also is an advance over the substance
of Dworkin's moral reading. Elsewhere, I have argued that Dworkin
never has developed a moral reading as a general substantive liberal
theory of our Constitution and underlying constitutional democracy.
To be sure, he has written powerfully and cogently about the major
constitutional issues of the day, and has done so from a coherent and
consistent viewpoint. Indeed, no one has made greater contributions
to constitutional theory than Dworkin has. But Dworkin has not
worked up a comprehensive yet elegant account of our basic liberties
and constitutional essentials as a substantive theory to beat Ely's
process-perfecting theory. 6 Sager makes a powerful stab at doing so
through developing a substantive conception of constitutional justice
with four concerns-equal membership, fair and open government,
50. Sager, supra note 1, at 23-26, 26-28.
51. Fleming, supra note 49.
52. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
53. See Sager, supra note 1, at 132-37.
54. See Fleming, supra note 47, at 1341.
55. See James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy (forthcoming
2006).
56. James E. Fleming, The Place of History and Philosophy in the Moral Reading
of the American Constitution, in Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of
Ronald Dworkin, supra note 24.
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opportunity to thrive, and independence 57-just as I have attempted
to do so through developing my Constitution-perfecting theory with
two themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy.58
In sum, Sager's justice-seeking account has advantages over
Dworkin's moral reading with regard to both structure and substance.
III. TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY OUTSIDE THE COURTS
A. Kramer's Conception of Popular Constitutionalism
Above, I suggested that Sager's and Kramer's accounts are
complementary: together they provide the ingredients for an
adequate account of how we might take the Constitution seriously
outside the courts. In this part, I shall develop this tack. Initially, I
want to ponder why Kramer devotes so much of his book to history:
the origins of judicial review and arguments throughout our history
for departmentalism over and against judicial supremacy? As I read
the book the first time, I wrote in the margin on the first page of
Chapter 8: "It's page 207 out of 253 and we are still in the early 1840s!
When are we going to get to Kramer's indictment of the hubris and
arrogance of the Rehnquist Court?" Here are several reasons one
might have written the historical book Kramer wrote, together with
my assessment of whether they seem apt here.
1. Antiquarian: simply because he has an interest in the history of
judicial review for its own sake? No.
2. Originalist: because he believes that we are obligated to be
faithful to the original understanding of judicial review? Decidedly
not.
3. Birth Logic: because he holds a view of the birth logic of judicial
review analogous to what Sager calls views of "the birth logic of a
democratic constitution," 59 and accordingly thinks that the
circumstances of the birth of judicial review have implications for its
later manifestations? Again, no.
4. Anti-necessitarian (to recall a long-forgotten but just revised idea
of Roberto Unger)6°: because he wants to shake up people who
believe that judicial supremacy is natural or necessary? Yes,
emphatically.
57. Sager, supra note 1, at 145-60.
58. See generally Fleming, supra note 56.
59. Sager, supra note 1, at 161-93.
60. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social
Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy (rev. ed. 2004).
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5. Retrieval: because he wants to excavate popular constitutionalism
to show its possibility and to suggest how we might apply it today?
Yes, most emphatically.
6. Lessons of experience: because he wants to present popular
constitutionalism as the norm throughout our nation's history, and
judicial supremacy the exception, and to show that the lessons of our
experience are that popular constitutionalism repeatedly rebuffs and
triumphs over judicial supremacy? Yes, definitely.
7. Hortatory: because he wants to exhort us to reconstruct popular
constitutionalism for our time and to overthrow judicial supremacy?
Yes, most certainly.
To combine 4, 5, 6, and 7, Kramer's historical analysis is in service
of a veritable "populist constitutional manifesto" (to adapt the subtitle
of Richard D. Parker's book, "Here, the People Rule": A
Constitutional Populist Manifesto6"). If I am right in my
interpretation, I want to commend Kramer for writing the kind of
constitutional history he has written.
Kramer develops a conception of popular constitutionalism that
rejects judicial supremacy in favor of both departmentalism and
populism. By departmentalism, as stated above, I mean the idea that
legislatures and executives share with courts authority to interpret the
Constitution and indeed are the ultimate interpreters on certain
questions. By populism, I mean the idea that the people themselves
are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution over and against the
judicial, legislative, and executive departments sharing authority to
interpret it. As noted above, Kramer, unlike Waldron and Tushnet,
does not propose "taking the Constitution away from the courts"
altogether. Instead, Kramer proposes "judicial review without judicial
supremacy. 62
Thus, I want to distinguish two strands of popular constitutionalism:
departmentalism and populism. They are not one and the same. One
can be a departmentalist without necessarily being a populist. On this
view, one might argue (1) that legislatures and executives, no less than
courts, have a duty conscientiously to interpret the Constitution, and
(2) that each coordinate branch is to be the ultimate interpreter
regarding certain matters, while yet believing (3) that legislatures and
executives will be capable of discharging their responsibilities only if
they can distance themselves from the interests, wants, and beliefs of
the people themselves. I hold this view.
And one can be a populist without necessarily being a
departmentalist. On this view, one might be a populist through and
through, (1) believing that the people themselves are conscientiously
61. Parker, supra note 7.
62. Kramer, supra note 2, at 249-53.
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committed to interpreting the Constitution and are capable of doing
so, while (2) distrusting the departments of government (legislatures
and executives to say nothing of courts) when it comes to commitment
and capacity to interpret and enforce the Constitution. Richard
Parker seems to exemplify this view.63 One catches more than a whiff
of such populism in Kramer's work, especially at the beginning and at
the end of his book, (1) in his explication of early American history
and the origins of judicial review and (2) in his attack on the hubris
and triumphalism of the Rehnquist Court.'
B. Kramer + Sager: The Domain of Popular Constitutionalism
Kramer does not articulate the domain of popular constitutionalism
(to adapt Sager's term): that is, he does not adequately differentiate
popular constitutionalism from, on the one hand, ordinary politics
and, on the other hand, political justice. Thus, he does not delineate
and articulate what the people themselves talk about, or how they talk
about it, when they themselves engage in constitutional interpretation
(in particular, when they act as ultimate interpreters of the
Constitution above and beyond courts, legislatures, and executives).
And he does not articulate how such popular constitutional discourse
differs from people's discourse about, on the one hand, their wants
and interests and, on the other hand, their conceptions of justice and
morality.
Furthermore, Kramer does not make clear in what sense the people
themselves are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. For one
thing, it is not clear that the Constitution, or constitutionalism, is
doing much work in popular constitutionalism. For another, it is not
clear that the people themselves, when they triumph over judicial
supremacy, are ultimately interpreting the Constitution, as
distinguished from it simply being the case that public opinion about
wants, interests, or justice has prevailed as a fact of political power
over judicial interpretations of the Constitution.
I want to sharpen the difference between (1) Kramer's conception
of popular constitutionalism over and against judicial supremacy and
(2) familiar calls for courts to defer to democratic self-government.
Constitutional scholars are used to hearing that courts should defer to
democratic self-government. And they are used to hearing pleas to let
the people rule concerning certain matters. But these pleas are
usually coupled with views that the Constitution "does not say
anything about" the matter in question, and indeed for that reason the
people are free to rule: (1) as they like (aggregating interests or
preferences through ordinary politics) or (2) as they think best
63. See generally Parker, supra note 7.
64. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 35-72, 225-48; Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We
the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 130-58 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, Foreword].
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(pursuing justice). In neither case are the people, in ruling, to be
guided by their own interpretation of the Constitution; instead, they
are to be guided either by interests or by justice, respectively. These
views simply do not leave space for a conception of popular
constitutionalism: a space within which the people deliberate about
the meaning of the Constitution and how its commitments guide and
bind them in democratic self-government as well as their agents in
governmental office.
Kramer's account is importantly different from these views. On his
conception, the Constitution does speak to the matter in question, the
people themselves are to offer and be guided by their own
interpretation of the Constitution, and indeed the people themselves
are to be the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. Thus,
Kramer's conception is importantly distinctive, and promises an
important contribution to constitutional theory. That being the case,
Kramer owes us a fuller account of what the domain of popular
constitutionalism looks like.
Now, Kramer does give us a good sense of what departmentalism
looks like. Most of his historical examples of popular
constitutionalism illustrate arguments for coordinate review or
departmentalism as against judicial supremacy. We need a clearer
picture of the people themselves in popular constitutionalism over and
against departmentalism, or at least as distinguished from
departmentalism. Kramer's examples of popular constitutionalism
over and against departmentalism are scarce: mainly, they amount to
hortatory and ominous proclamations that the people themselves
should control their agents in the departments of government, and
that the people themselves always ultimately triumph over the
courts. 66
Kramer's account of popular constitutionalism would be sharpened
if he were to develop it in light of Sager's account of domains (or
concentric circles) from (1) the judicially enforced Constitution, to (2)
constitutional justice, to (3) political justice, and finally to (4) morality
generally. Presumably, Kramer would contemplate that the people
themselves are the ultimate interpreters and decision makers in all of
these domains, most notably in the realm of the judicially enforced
Constitution. After all, he criticizes Rehnquist Court decisions
coming within the judicially enforced Constitution from the
standpoint of popular constitutionalism.67 Of course, part of his
criticism of the Rehnquist Court for its hubris and triumphalism is that
it has expanded the domain of the judicially enforced Constitution
beyond what it should be on a proper conception of judicial review
65. Kramer, supra note 2, at 106-11.
66. See id. at 24-28, 227.
67. See id. at 229-31; Kramer, Foreword, supra note 64, at 130-58.
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without judicial supremacy: it has made the judicially enforced
Constitution practically coterminous with the Constitution itself.68
Indeed, the Rehnquist Court practically denies that there is, in Sager's
terms, a gap between the judicially enforced Constitution and the
Constitution itself.69
Presumably, Kramer would contemplate that when the people
themselves deliberate about our constitutional commitments, they
partly deliberate about commitments that are within the judicially
enforceable Constitution, and partly deliberate about commitments
that are binding outside the courts upon legislatures and executives as
a matter of constitutional justice. I imagine that Kramer would not
put as much stock as Sager does in the distinction between the domain
of constitutional justice and that of political justice. That is,
presumably on his view the people themselves, when they deliberate
about constitutional justice, may well spill over into deliberating about
political justice beyond the Constitution-and thus popular
constitutionalism may well become simply popular self-government.
I raise the matter to suggest once again that the constitutionalism in
Kramer's conception of popular constitutionalism is underdeveloped.
All of Kramer's historical examples of popular constitutionalism
provide answers to the question of who may interpret-and involve
rejection of claims that courts rather than other departments or the
people themselves are the ultimate or exclusive interpreters of the
Constitution. None of them gives us any idea of what is the content of
the constitutionalism in popular constitutionalism and how it binds
and guides the people themselves.7" Thus, it is not clear that there is
any particular content to popular constitutionalism that constrains the
people themselves. Indeed, Kramer practically concedes as much
when he speaks of popular constitutionalism as a commitment to a
democratic process itself, not to any "particular substantive"
program.71 The upshot of all this is that it is not clear that there is a
domain of popular constitutionalism as distinguished from the
domains of ordinary politics and justice.
Tushnet, in Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,
acknowledges that the content of the "thin Constitution" of populist
constitutionalism has got to be mighty thin to be credible: basically, a
commitment to realizing the purposes of the Preamble to the
Constitution and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.72
Within such a populist constitutionalism, the thin Constitution does
68. Kramer, supra note 2, at 225.
69. Sager, supra note 1, at 86-92, 109-24.
70. 1 was confirmed in this interpretation by both Kramer's and Willy Forbath's
comments at the Symposium on Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously
Outside the Courts, Fordham University School of Law (Nov. 19, 2004).
71. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 196.
72. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 11-13.
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not manifest a substantive vision. Instead, it expresses an attitude of
conscientious faith in the project of realizing the commitments of the
Declaration and the Preamble-whatever the people themselves may
decide they turn out to be.73 Kramer should tell us whether his
conception of the Constitution is similarly thin and, more generally,
should tell us what is the constitutionalism in his popular
constitutionalism.
All this about the content or the thinness of popular
constitutionalism may trouble constitutional theorists who are judging
the persuasiveness of Kramer's book. They will want to know in what
sense, if any, the people themselves are constrained by constitutional
commitments. And if the people themselves are not, these theorists
probably will think either (1) that Kramer has simply showed us
something about the fact of political power as such (that a strong
majority determined to rule ultimately can do that, and its ability to
do so does not necessarily imply that doing so is just or even
legitimate) or (2) that his notion of popular constitutionalism at the
end of the day is simply a conception of popular self-government that
for all practical purposes leaves the Constitution out of it. If so, it is
not as distinctive as I posited above.
Kramer needs not only an account of the domain of popular
constitutionalism, but also an account of what I would call "the people
themselves' two selves": (1) their ordinary political selves and (2)
their constitutional selves. Here I would recall my critique of
Christopher Eisgruber's and Jed Rubenfeld's theories of
constitutional self-government in the first symposium in this series:
"The Missing Selves in Constitutional Self-Government."74  Bruce
Ackerman, in elaborating his theory of dualist democracy, provides an
account of the people's two selves presupposed by his dualism: (1) the
ordinary selves engaged in ordinary politics and (2) the constitutional
selves engaged in constitutional politics.75 But his account narrowly
limits the people's constitutional selves to their role in amending the
Constitution (inside or outside the formal procedures of Article V).
And Ackerman evidently does not conceive the people's
constitutional selves as having a role as the ultimate interpreters of the
Constitution, either before they amend it or after they do so. Once
the people's constitutional selves amend the Constitution, inside or
outside Article V, courts are the ultimate interpreters who preserve
the higher law of the Constitution against encroachment by the
ordinary law of legislation.76
73. See Fleming, supra note 13, at 236.
74. James E. Fleming, The Missing Selves in Constitutional Self-Government, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 1789 (2003).
75. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 230-65, 266-94 (1991).
76. Id. at 60, 72.
1393
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Kramer, because of his commitment to popular constitutionalism,
needs an account of the people's constitutional selves of the sort that
Ackerman lacks. For Kramer, unlike Ackerman, sees the people
themselves as being the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution,
before and after amendment, and not just during the process of
amendment. Not surprisingly, Kramer specifically says that
Ackerman is not a popular constitutionalist in his sense.7  The
scholars and judges whom Kramer conceives as "elit[ists]" or
"aristocrats"78 fear or hate the people's ordinary political selves as
engaged in ordinary politics, and they doubt the capacity or indeed
the possibility of the people's constitutional selves to be ultimate
interpreters of the Constitution. It is this possibility that Kramer
needs to bolster. To do so, again, he needs an account of the domain
of popular constitutionalism, including an account of the
constitutional selves of the people themselves.
C. Sager + Kramer: Partnership and Departmentalism
If Kramer's conception of popular constitutionalism could be
refined in light of Sager's account of the domain of constitutional
justice, Sager's partnership model could be refined to embrace a
moderate version of what Kramer calls departmentalism. Sager
advances a partnership model, as contrasted with an agency model, of
the relationship between the founders/amenders and judges.79 On this
view, judges interpreting the Constitution are partners with
founders/amenders in seeking justice. By contrast, on originalist
views, judges interpreting the Constitution are the agents of
founders/amenders and accordingly are duty bound to carry out their
instructions. In other words, Sager argues that judges should be
justice-seekers, not originalists (whether narrow or broad). (Sager
also contrasts a partnership model with a guardianship model, in the
obligatory move by moral readers and justice-seekers to deflect the
predictable objection that he conceives judges as Platonic guardians or
philosopher-judges.)°
Let us distinguish between two dimensions of a partnership model.
First, the vertical dimension over time: the relationship between
founders/amenders and interpreters. Both are partners in pursuing
justice. Second, the horizontal dimension at any given time: the
relationship between judges, on the one hand, and legislatures and
executives (and ultimately the people themselves), on the other. All
are partners in pursuing justice.
77. See Kramer, supra note 14, at 961 n.3.
78. Kramer, supra note 2, at 242, 247.
79. Sager, supra note 1, at 14-16.
80. Id. at 16.
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Sager's analysis of partnership includes both dimensions, but I think
it is fair to say that he develops the vertical dimension more fully than
the horizontal dimension. He elaborates the vertical dimension in
fending off originalists of various stripes.81 I would have expected him
to give a fuller account of the horizontal dimension, given the
centrality of the underenforcement thesis in his justice-seeking
account. That is, Sager's own account would seem to call for
explicating this dimension of the partnership, in particular, in his
notion of judicial underenforcement and the gap between the
judicially enforced Constitution and the whole Constitution that is
binding outside the courts upon legislatures, executives, and citizens
generally. We need to know more about the character of the
partnership between courts, on the one hand, and legislatures,
executives, and citizens, on the other, in fully enforcing constitutional
norms.
I want to develop the horizontal dimension more fully in exploring
how legislatures and executives should take the Constitution seriously
outside the courts. In particular, I shall explore (1) whether Sager's
partnership model presupposes, and should explicitly incorporate, a
moderate form of departmentalism concerning who may interpret the
Constitution, and (2) whether we can say more than Sager himself
does about how legislatures and executives are to engage in
constitutional interpretation.
Sager should refine the horizontal dimension of the partnership
model to embrace a moderate departmentalism. Why so? First, it
accords with the better reading of Marbury v. Madison8 2 championed
by Kramer: the narrow rather than the broad interpretation. On the
narrow reading, courts as well as other departments are charged with
the responsibility of interpreting the Constitution; they are not set up
as the special guardians of constitutional norms (whether as the
ultimate or the exclusive interpreters).83 Thus, departmentalism
accords with the best justification for judicial review. Furthermore, it
accords with the best understanding of a partnership, i.e., a conception
of courts, legislatures, and executives as coordinate branches who
share authority, as contrasted with an understanding of courts as
special guardians of constitutional norms over and against a distrustful
conception of legislatures, executives, and the people themselves as
violators of constitutional norms. What is more, departmentalism
puts teeth or structure into the idea of a partnership, which otherwise
is at risk for sounding like little more than a metaphor from a
presidential fireside chat or state of the union message. Finally,
departmentalism is right, both historically and normatively.
81. Id. at 30-41.
82. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 37 (1803).
83. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 114-27.
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Would Sager resist departmentalism in favor of judicial supremacy?
I suppose that would depend on the form of departmentalism we are
talking about. Perhaps a strong theory of coordinate review or
departmentalism like those championed by Presidents Jefferson and
Jackson' would be too strong for Sager's court-loving tastes. But a
more moderate departmentalism- a version fully compatible with the
narrow reading of Marbury concerning the scope and justification of
judicial review-should accord well with the general outlines of his
partnership model.
Strikingly, Sager does not give us an account of how legislatures and
executives are to engage in conscientious constitutional interpretation
in discharging their obligations more fully to protect judicially
underenforced constitutional norms. It is worse than that. His
account of and presuppositions concerning legislatures are so
skeptical, if not disparaging, of their capacities and incentives that he
gives us little reason to believe, or even hope, that they are up to their
responsibilities to enforce the Constitution. Indeed, his
presuppositions about legislatures give us reason to fear that they are
not up to their responsibilities to do so. And he certainly does not
give us reason to have confidence that legislatures, like courts, are
capable of being what Dworkin once called "guardians of principle." 6
As is well known, Dworkin said that courts are to be a "forum of
principle.""7 It is less well known that he said that legislatures too are
to be "guardians of principle."
Unlike Sager, other scholars have provided accounts of legislatures
as institutions that have the capacities and incentives to enforce the
Constitution. Indeed, according to Sunstein, legislatures and
executives, historically, have been superior fora of principle to
courts.88 Tushnet's account of an "incentive-compatible" or self-
enforcing Constitution is arguably the best of such accounts (which is
not to say that one should go all the way with him in "taking the
Constitution away from the courts").89 Again, Sager is too much of a
court-lover and legislature-skeptic for his own good, given his own
theory. For his own account of judicial underenforcement and thus of
the enforcement of the Constitution outside the courts presupposes
that legislatures and executives are capable of reflecting
conscientiously upon the meaning of the Constitution and upon how
more fully to enforce constitutional norms.
In sum, Sager does not provide an adequate account of how
legislatures, as partners with courts in enforcing the Constitution, will
84. See id. at 106-07, 171-72, 183, 189.
85. See generally Sager, supra note 1.
86. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 3, at 31.
87. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, supra note 44, at 69-71.
88. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
89. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 95-128.
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be capable of engaging in, and in fact will engage in, constitutional
interpretation (however conceived). Nor does Kramer, as noted
above, but Kramer's account of legislatures does give us reason not
just to hope, but indeed positively to believe, that legislatures-and
ultimately the people themselves-will be up to the challenge of
seeking justice. He provides a realistic, concrete assessment of the
capacities and incentives of courts as well as of legislatures. 9 He also
provides a constructive comparative assessment of courts and
legislatures. Law professors are used to comparing a somewhat
idealized vision of courts with a rather jaded vision of legislatures; not
surprisingly, courts come off well through such comparisons. Kramer
neither makes this move nor makes the opposite move of comparing a
jaded view of courts with a somewhat idealized view of legislatures.
He engages in a fair comparison and gets things about right. In light
of his comparison, we can genuinely view legislatures and courts as
partners in seeking justice.
That said, neither Larry gives an account of constitutional
interpretation outside the courts. To be sure, Sager's theory does not
promise, and does not require, as much in this regard as Kramer's.
Still, Sager owes us an account of how legislatures and executives will
conscientiously and responsibly interpret the Constitution-and not
merely do ordinary politics on the one hand or political justice on the
other-when they politically enforce constitutional norms that are
judicially underenforced. Sager, as a justice seeker, may have less
difficulty providing such an account-or at least all the account he
needs-than would most constitutional theorists. After all, for most
constitutional theorists, constitutional interpretation is quite court-
centered and thus peculiarly legal (on their view, in Kramer's terms,
the Constitution is a "lawyer's contract," not a "layman's
document"91). Such theorists presumably would be at a loss to say
how legislatures and executives should or could engage in
constitutional interpretation. For one thing, most probably view
constitutional interpretation as something technical, lawyerly, and
judge-like, an enterprise that is simply beyond the ken of legislatures
and executives. For another, constitutional theorists typically have
such a disparaging view of legislatures that they would be loath to
credit them with the capacity and incentives to take the Constitution
seriously, even to follow it, let alone independently to interpret it
conscientiously.
Why might Sager have less difficulty providing an account of
constitutional interpretation outside the courts than such typical
constitutional theorists? On his view, the Constitution is a charter of
abstract moral principles, our constitutional practice is justice seeking,
90. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 237-41.
91. See id. at 207, 217.
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and legislatures and executives are partners with courts in seeking
justice. Legislatures and executives presumably are more capable of
engaging in wide-bodied interpretation of such a constitution of
principles than they would be of engaging in peculiarly legal
interpretation of a lawyer's contract or a code of detailed historical
rules. Nonetheless, Sager still owes us an account of what legislatures
do-and how it differs from or is similar to what courts do-when
they give fuller enforcement to judicially underenforced constitutional
norms.
Does Kramer's account help in this regard? Above, I suggested
that Kramer does not give an adequate account of the domain of
popular constitutionalism: What will the people themselves talk
about, and how will they talk about it, when they serve as the ultimate
interpreters of the Constitution? Does Kramer do anything more
than exhort us to have more trust or confidence in the people
themselves-and in legislatures and executives-rather than
subscribing to the view that judicial supremacy is natural or
inevitable?
One, Kramer exhorts us to believe in the capacity of the people
themselves to be the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. What
arguments does he make for believing in the possibility of such a
popular constitutionalism? Most importantly, he makes the historical
case that popular constitutionalism has always ultimately triumphed
over judicial supremacy. I am reminded of the story of the man who
was asked whether he believed in baptism. He answered, "Yes, I've
seen it done." Likewise, if I am asked whether I believe in popular
constitutionalism, I can answer, "Yes, I've seen it done-I have read
Kramer's book." Kramer, going beyond exhortation, practically
presents the triumph of popular constitutionalism over judicial
supremacy as inexorable or inevitable. Rhetorically, his move here is
powerful in combating assumptions that judicial supremacy is not only
natural but indeed inevitable. It should also be powerful in making
liberal judicial supremacists worry that they are being myopic, and in
warning them that judicial supremacy has more often furthered
conservative commitments than liberal or progressive ones.
Two, Kramer frames the choice between popular constitutionalism
and judicial supremacy in terms of what Parker has called "a matter of
sensibility":9" populist or elitist. To the extent that it is in fact a matter
of sensibility, Kramer's project of popular constitutionalism may have
a tougher row to hoe than I had thought. For it may be harder to
argue scholars and judges out of their elitist court-loving sensibilities
(and to accept that the people themselves have the capacities for
popular constitutionalism) than to argue them out of their theoretical
positions (for example, to persuade them to renounce judicial
92. Id. at 241 (quoting Parker, supra note 7, at 4).
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supremacy for departmentalism). After all, sensibility may be what it
sounds like: sensibility. People, by the time they are adults, may have
developed either populist sensibilities or elitist sensibilities. And
there may be little point-and little prospect of success-in trying to
argue them out of such sensibilities.
IV. KRAMER + SAGER: THE RIGHT MIX OF INGREDIENTS FOR AN
ADEQUATE THEORY OF TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY
OUTSIDE THE COURTS
It is striking that Kramer does not discuss Sager's notion of judicial
underenforcement in his arguments against judicial supremacy. He
does discuss notions with affinities to it, including the idea that
deferential "rational basis scrutiny" is "a rule of judicial restraint, not
substantive constitutional law,"93 and Herbert Wechsler's famous
argument regarding the political safeguards of federalism.94 One
might also mention separation of powers here, that is, the assumption
or argument that the Constitution is self-enforcing through the
national political processes when it comes to separation of powers. 95
Notably, Kramer does not present these as instances of judicial
underenforcement, or of the Constitution outside the courts. Why
this omission?
At the same time, it is striking that Sager includes little discussion of
federalism and separation of powers in his explication of judicial
underenforcement. He discusses United States v. Morrison and
mentions United States v. Lopez, two Rehnquist Court decisions that
have revitalized aggressive judicial protection of federalism-related
limitations on Congress's powers.96 But he does not mention the
arguments against aggressive judicial enforcement of federalism and
separation of powers. Granted, in presenting the underenforcement
thesis, Sager puts the focus on enforcement of the liberty-bearing
provisions of the Constitution rather than on structures and powers.
Still, why this omission?
93. Kramer, supra note 2, at 219.
94. Id. at 224 (discussing Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954)). Such arguments have been championed,
for example, by Justice White in dissent in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
188 (1992) (White, J., dissenting), by Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and by
Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980), not to
mention by Kramer himself. See Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21.
95. This argument also has been championed by Justice White and Jesse Choper.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Choper, supra
note 94.
96. Sager, supra note 1, at 109-14, 122, 125-26 (discussing United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and mentioning United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995)).
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Perhaps we can just talk about separation of powers and
federalism-(1) in Madisonian terms of ambition counteracting
ambition and the like without need for courts to be special guardians
of constitutional norms,97 or (2) in Tushnet's terms of constitutional
self-enforcement through the political processes," or (3) in terms of
the Constitution being "a machine that would go of itself"99 -without
needing to bring in Sager's more specific idea of judicial
underenforcement. Here, perhaps, is the difference between judicial
underenforcement and constitutional self-enforcement, or the
difference between Sager's and Tushnet's theories of taking the
Constitution seriously outside the courts. °0 That is, maybe Sager's
judicial underenforcement thesis is a specific conception that stems
from the institutional limitations of courts, whereas the political
safeguards of federalism argument and the argument against
aggressive judicial enforcement of separation of powers stem from
broader conceptions of the Constitution as being self-enforcing
through the political processes.
In any event, Kramer's account of popular constitutionalism should
include Sager's judicial underenforcement thesis. And Sager's
account of judicial underenforcement should include a notion of
federalism and separation of powers as being self-enforcing through
the national political processes. In conclusion, if we put the two
Larrys' theories together, we get the right mix of ingredients for an
adequate conception of taking the Constitution seriously outside the
courts!
97. See generally The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).
98. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 95-128.
99. See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself (1986).
100. See the exchange between Sager and Tushnet in the Symposium on The
Constitution and the Good Society. Compare Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions
and the Good Society, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1989 (2001), with Mark Tushnet,
Constitution-Talk and Justice-Talk, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1999 (2001).
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